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ABOOD AND ITS PROGENY: CONFLICTING 
PERSPECTIVES ON SAFEGUARDING UNION 
SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Mary Aslanian-Bedikiant 
It cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in 
regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from 
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the 
citizenry in general. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Against the backdrop of these words unfolded the modern-day 
concept of public sector agency shop agreements. Reflected in this 
language is the expansion of the private sector labor law model 
into the public sector, paralleling the advent of unionization 
among public sector employees. One controversial aspect of this 
model is the agency shop agreement as a permissible variant of the 
closed union shop provision popularized in the late 1930's.2 Essen-
tially viewed as a logical economicS outgrowth of the principles of 
t Michigan Regional Director of American Arbitration Association. 
1. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1967). 
2. A closed shop provision requires an employee, as a condition of employment, to be-
come a member of the union prior to being employed. Such an arrangement, while lawful 
under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, has since been proscribed by the Taft-
Hartley Amendments. A union shop provision, on the other hand, requires an employee, as 
a condition of employment, to become a member of the union within a specified period, 
usually 30 days from date of hire. The inclusion of this type of provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement is sanctioned by the National Labor Relations Act, except where oth-
erwise pre-empted by state right-to-work laws. An agency shop provision merely requires an 
employee to pay an amount equal to the periodic union dues uniformly required as a condi-
tion of continued employment, without becoming a member of the union. The distinction 
between union shop and agency shop agreements became blurred by the U. S. Supreme 
Court decision in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) which held that the 
membership requirement authorized under the union security proviso to the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, section 8(a)(3), related to the "core" obligation of paying the apportion-
able fees. 
3. Practitioners in the labor relations field have regarded agency shop agreements as 
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exclusivity and fair representation,· agency shop agreements re-
quire nonunion employees to tender payment of service fees 
equivalent to established membership dues as a condition of con-
tinued employment. 
In the context of Abood v. Detroit Board of Educationr. and its 
progeny, compelled contributions via the negotiation of an agency 
shop provision in collective bargaining agreements have been 
firmly established. Proponents argue that public sector union se-
curity (1) provides unions with financial stability and thus makes 
them more reliable bargaining representatives, (2) encourages a re-
sponsible union because the organization need not make excessive 
"demands for the purpose of obtaining new adherents or retaining 
old ones in the face of competing considerations and, (3) ensures 
that employees pay for benefits that they inevitably receive as a 
result of the union's efforts on their behalf.8 Opponents, on the 
other hand, argue that the adoption of union security agreements 
places the public employer in the position of encouraging union 
membership, thereby violating the public employees' "right to 
work."7 
It is evident that a complete reconciliation of the two counter-
vailing policies, the constitutionality of public sector agency shop 
agreements and the associational rights of public employees, has 
yet to be made. To accomplish such a reconciliation, there must be 
a more careful examination of the nature of unions operating 
within the public sector and the collective bargaining activities in 
economic tools for advancing collective bargaining services. Through the requirement that 
all employees share in the union's costs of fulfilling its statutory responsibilities, each indi-
vidual becomes a recipient and third-party beneficiary of the "goods" acquired through col-
lective bargaining and related services. For a further explanation of how such agreements 
are treated as effective economic mechanisms, see Levinson, After Abood: Public Sector 
Union Security and the Protection of Individual Public Employee Rights, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 
1 (1977). 
4. Developed primarily from the private sector model, exclusive recognition occurs when 
a union, designated as the collective bargaining representative, is deemed the exclusive rep-
resentative of all employees irrespective of union membership. Id. The duty of fair represen-
tation, on the other hand, is defined as "a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all 
members [of the bargaining unit] without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise 
its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca 
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
5. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
6. See Levinson, supra note 3. 
7. Id. 
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which they participate. If political activity unrelated to collective 
bargaining and financed under its guise is to cease, a clarification 
as to the increased access that public sector unions maintain with 
governmental policy-makers through collective bargaining channels 
must be rendered. 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the judicial attitude to-
ward agency shop agreements, revisiting only briefly the period 
preceding Abood. Emphasis will be given to the disposition of 
agency shop cases by the Michigan courts. In Part I of the Article, 
state interests and other countervailing forces which undercut first 
amendment associational freedoms, as developed in Railway Em-
ployees' Department u. Hanson,8 and refined in International As-
sociation of Machinists u. Street,9 are analyzed in relation to the 
federal policy favoring stability in labor relations. The constitu-
tional imprimatur upon agency shop agreements was significantly 
expanded in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Abood. 
This development serves as the focal point for Part II of the Arti-
cle. And finally, in Part III, the author discusses the application 
and extension of compelling state interests and the first amend-
ment penumbra of associationalliberties within the context of the 
progeny of Abood. 
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS 
The basis for union security fee agreements can be traced back 
to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.10 Expressed 
within the legislative enactment was unequivocal recognition that 
union bargaining activities involved expenses that should be 
defrayed by union members and nonunion employees alike. The 
principal policy consideration turned, not only upon the elimina-
tion of the so-called "free-rider" who would be subject to reap the 
beJ1efits of collective bargaining without assuming its costs, but 
also upon the promotion of labor stability by decreasing competing 
employee demands.ll 
8. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
9. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
10. Labor Managements Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 
(1983). 
11. See Fox, State Legislated Agency Shop Clause Requiring Payment of Service 
Charge by Non-Union Public Employees is Valid for Collective Bargaining Purposes But 
Compulsory Dues May Not be Used for Political Causes Opposed by Non-Union Members, 
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The United States Supreme Court's initial opportunity to inter-
pret and analyze the impact of union shop agreements came some 
years later in the celebrated case of Railway Employees' Depart-
ment v. Hanson.1i In Hanson, the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of an agency shop provision, thereby striking down a 
state right-to-work lawlS which barred union affiliation as a condi-
tion of employment.14 The rationale for adopting this conclusion 
was expressed by the Court as follows: 
It is said that the right to work, which the Court has frequently included 
in the concept of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause, (see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Takahaski v. Fish & Game 
Commission, 334 U.S. 410), may not be denied by the Congress. The 
question remains, however, whether the long-range interests of workers 
would be better served by one type of union agreement or another. That 
question is germane to the exercise of power under the Commerce 
Clause-a power that often has the quality of police regulations. See 
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19. One would have to be blind 
to history to assert that trade unionism did not enhance and strengthen 
the right to work. See Webb, History of Trade Unionism; Gregory, Labor 
and the Law. To require, rather than induce, the beneficiaries of trade 
unionism to contribute to its costs may not be the wisest course. But 
Congress might well believe that it would help insure the right to work in 
and along the arteries of interstate commerce. 15 
The Court's recognition that the requirements for financial sup-
port of the collective bargaining agent by those who receive the 
benefits of its work is not violative of the first or fifth amendments 
was perfected in International Association of Machinists v. 
Street. 18 In Street, railroad employees sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of a union shop agreement which required all employees 
27 CATH. U.L. REV. 132 (1977). "These amendments remedy the most serious abuses of 
compulsory union membership and yet . .. [promote} stability by eliminating [free rid-
ers}. Free riders are nonunion employees who pay none of the union's collective bargaining 
expenses but still receive many benefits resulting from union negotiations." [d. at 136. (em-
phasis added)(quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947». 
12. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
13. The Railway Labor Act, § 2, (11th) of 1926, authorized labor agreements requiring 
every employee to tender "the periodic dues, initiation fees and assessments ... uniformly 
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." The Act, as designed, per-
mitted government intervention only when the employers and their employees could not 
resolve their differences by private negotiations. 
14. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. 
15. [d. at 234-35. 
16. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
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to join the union and pay initiation fees, assessments and dues to 
retain their jobs. The nonunion employees' argument was that the 
fees promoted the propagation of political and economic doctrines 
contrary to their personally held political views.17 
Here, the Court addressed the first amendment argument only 
to the extent of declining to approve compulsory financial support 
by employees where a political expenditure, not related to collec-
tive bargaining, was involved, thus preserving the individual right 
of support or abstention. While it did not directly confront the 
first amendment issue, it did unequivocally reaffirm the holding in 
Hanson by upholding the validity of agency shop agreements.18 
The decision of the majority in Street precipitated two vigorous 
but opposing dissents. IS It was in the dissents that the competing 
considerations advanced against promoting labor peace and stabil-
ity crystallized. While recognizing the obvious reluctance of the 
Court to address the first amendment constitutional issues, the 
Black dissent argued that section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor 
Act abridged first amendment rights by compelling political sup-
port from unwilling and unwitting employees, for "whether there is 
such abridgment depends not only on how the law is written, but 
also .on how it works."20 Black observed that neither advocating 
nor propagating ideological doctrine and philosophies under the 
Railway Labor Act conforms to the charter of political and reli-
gious liberty advanced by the first amendment. Thus, Black con-
cluded that the statute, in permitting the application of the union 
shop contract, violated the freedom of speech guarantee of the first 
amendment.21 
In the second dissent, authored by Justice Frankfurt~r and con-
curred in by Justice Harlan, it was held that the statute should not 
be given a restrictive reading, and that Congress, in authorizing 
union shop agreements, did not intend to restrain or limit the 
scope of activities in the expenditure of union funds. On the con-
trary, Congress expanded the parties' freedom of choice by render-
ing union shop agreements permissive. Legislative efforts in this 
17. Id. at 744-45. 
18. Id. at 749. 
19. Id. at 780-97 (Black, J., dissenting); Id. at 747-819 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 789 (Black, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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area were prompted by the abuses which existed in the industrial 
sector. Thus, concluded both Frankfurter and Harlan, the legisla-
tive history of the Act demonstrated that Congress, fully aware of 
union permeation into the political substructure, supported an ex-
pansive reading of "appropriate" union expenditures. 22 
In both Hanson and Street, the majority refused to define union 
political involvement in areas unrelated to collective bargaining, 
except to note that assessments used to force ideological conform-
ity with union goals would involve first amendment considerations. 
The Court recognized, however, in Street, though not in Hanson, 
that the Railway Labor Act authorized union shop dues expendi-
tures for purposes germane only to collective bargaining, contract 
administration and grievance adjustment.23 
The test for protecting first amendment freedoms was formu-
lated by the Supreme Court during the interval between the Han-
son and the Street decisions. As a precursor to the latter, the 
Court, in NAACP v. Alabama,24 recognized the right to associate 
as an "inseparable aspect" of freedom of speech under the first and 
fourteenth amendments.211 This recognition was extended in Elrod 
v. Burns,26 where the Court established the principal legal test to 
be applied in those situations which juxtapose associational free-
doms against the legitimacy of agency shop agreements.27 The 
Court observed that when government action has a deterrent effect 
on first amendment rights, the government action "must survive 
exacting scrutiny,"28 meaning the interest advanced by the govern-
ment must be paramount. The Court noted that "the burden is on 
the government to show the existence of such an interest . . . 
[and] care must be taken not to confuse the interest of partisan 
organizations with governmental interests [since] only the latter 
will suffice. "29 
The Supreme Court, however, did not apply the "exacting scru-
tiny" test in the Street case. Ostensibly, two propositions have 
22. [d. at 818 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
23. [d. at 757-64. 
24. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
25. [d. at 460. 
26. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
27. [d. at 362-63. 
28. [d. at 362. 
29. [d. 
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been advanced as to why the Court rendered a decision without 
conducting a constitutional inquiry into the violation of first 
amendment rights: (1) the Court refused to recognize the first 
amendment right not to associate; or (2) the Court recognized the 
first amendment right but found that government interests in pre-
serving labor stability justified the infringement upon such a 
right. so 
The failure of the Court to work Street through a demanding 
analysis and the Court's subsequent reliance on the case in Abood 
raise some valid questions as to the importance attached to the 
constellation of first amendment rights. In large measure, the 
Court deftly evaded the primary constitutional issue as to when 
infringement of an employee's right of association is justified by 
the government interests advanced. 
A distinction which the author believes to be valid here, despite 
the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to confront the constitu-
tional issues, is that public sector bargaining differs markedly from 
private sector bargaining. It is axiomatic that the two types of ex-
penditures raised in the foregoing cases, political and bargaining, 
have fundamentally different objectives. As a consequence, a dif-
ferent set of standards would apply based upon the nature of the 
expenditures. Public employment relations are immersed in local 
political dynamics and affected by economic gyrations. It is con-
ceivable that the Supreme Court's failure or unwillingness to ad-
dress the key constitutional issues stemmed from its inability to 
develop a formula which would permit a clear-cut line of demarca-
tion to be drawn between activities strictly political in nature, and 
those which further collective bargaining and contract administra-
tion efforts. 
II. Abood AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CONCEPT OF UNION SECURITY 
In 1969, a complaint for declaratory relief was filed in Wayne 
County Circuit Court challenging the constitutional and statutory 
validity of the agency shop provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the Detroit Board of Education and the De-
30. See Comment, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education Association as a First Amend-
ment Right-the Protection of the Non-Member Employee in the Context of Public Sector 
Unionism, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 487, 492. 
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troit Federation of Teachers.81 The plaintiffs' primary contention 
was that a substantial part of the sums exacted from teachers, pur-
suant to the agency shop clause, was used for the advancement of 
political, social and ideological causes unrelated to the purpose of 
collective bargaining. For this reason, plaintiffs argued, compulsory 
payment deprived them of the constitutional protection of associa-
tion and other rights under the first and fourteenth amendments 
and their penumbras. 
The dismissal of the initial action by the court culminated in the 
filing of a new action in which essentially identical allegations were 
asserted. As in the previous case, the plaintiffs did not seek to re-
strain any expenditures of the monies collected, nor did they iden-
tify with specificity the causes to which they took intellectual um-
brage. Almost simultaneously with the commencement of this new 
action was the enactment of an amendment to Section 10 of the 
Public Employment Relations Act of 1973 (PERA). The Act, in 
relevant part, stated 
[n]othing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public 
employer from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative as defined in Section 11 and to require as a condition of em-
ployment that all employees in the bargaining unit pay to the exclusive 
bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the amount of dues 
uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining 
representative.82 
The purpose of the Act's amendment was to reinforce the public 
policy in Michigan of stabilizing and rendering more effective pub-
lic sector labor relations. This would be accomplished by permit-
ting employees in a bargaining unit to contribute financially to the 
exclusive bargaining agent by tendering a service fee uniformly re-
quired of union members. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants 
31. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). This case was originally filed in 
Wayne County as Warczak v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. It was ultimately resurrected, subsequent 
to its dismissal, in essentially identical substantive form in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209 (1977). In 1972, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the dismissal order in 
Warczak and remanded the case to the circuit court for a further review based upon the 
intervening decision in Smigel v. Southgate Comm. School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 
305 (1972)(which held that agency shop clauses were precluded by language in the Public 
Employment Relations Act). Both Warzcak and Abood were then consolidated for hearings 
but dismissed at the circuit court level. (See infra note 64). 
32. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (1978). 
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upheld the validity of the agency shop clause. The Michigan Court 
of Appeals affirmed this decision.33 An appeal by the plaintiffs was 
denied by the Michigan Supreme Court3• and the United States 
Supreme Court ultimately interceded.36 
Speaking through Justice Stewart, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the agency shop arrangement as one which did not 
violate the first and fourteenth amendments. Relying on the Han-
son decision, the Court held that "the requirement for financial 
support of the collective bargaining agency by all who receive the 
benefits of its work . . . does not violate . . . the First . . . 
Amendment. "38 
Further, embracing the doctrine of exclusivity advanced in fed-
erallabor law, the Court observed that, pursuant to Michigan law, 
employees of local government enjoy comparable rights of self-or-
ganization and collective bargaining.37 In advancing this position, 
the Court recognized the broad discretion which states maintain in 
determining and limiting the terms and conditions of their own 
public employment. The Court noted, however, that the use of ser-
vice fees for political or social, religious and ideological purposes, 
unrelated to the collective bargaining sphere and to which public 
employees objected, was in fact unconstitutional, and constituted 
an abridgment of first amendment rights.38 
In dealing with the appellants' pivotal argument that public em-
ployees have a weightier first amendment interest than private em-
ployees, the Court established the predominant distinction as one 
between employers and not employees. This distinction was ana-
lyzed as follows: 
Public employees are not basically different from private employees; on 
the whole, they have the same sort of skills, the same needs, and seek the 
same advantages. 'The uniqueness of public employment is not in the 
employees nor in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special 
character of the employer.'8e 
33. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322 (1975). 
34. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 395 Mich. 755 (1975). 
35. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 425 U.S. 949 (1976). 
36. Abood, 431 U.S. at 219 (quoting Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238). 
37. [d. at 223. 
38. [d. at 234-35. 
39. [d. at 229-30 (quoting Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmen-
tal Decisionmaking, 44 U. elN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1975)(emphasis added by the court». 
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The Supreme Court additionally discussed the problem of estab-
lishing appropriate refund arrangements where a "compulsory 
dues" provision had been negotiated, and where service fees were 
used for political and ideological purposes. Remedies to which 
plaintiffs might be entitled included (a) an injunction against ex-
penditures for political causes opposed by the plaintiffs, (b) resti-
tution of a portion of the funds exacted from the plaintiffs in the 
proportion that union political expenditures opposed by the plain-
tiffs bore to the total union expenditures, and (c) the reduction of 
future exactions by the same proportion.40 
The discernible difficulty in formulating remedies other than 
routine remand and denial of the requested injunction stemmed 
from the Court's recognition that had the teachers informed the 
union of their objections, any subsequent expenditures could be 
deemed to constitute a violation of first amendment rights. Their 
apparent failure to do so, however, did not impact upon the valid-
ity of the request, but rather culminated in the failure to vindicate 
their rights by fully exhausting contractual internal remedies.41 
The separate concurring opinion of Justice Powell, which sup-
ported the specific order of remand, observed that the very nature 
of public employee collective bargaining was politica1.42 In the nor-
mal context, state adopted union shop agreements may be likened 
to "coercive government regulation;" thus, the constitutional rights 
of the employees required a substantial protection which the Court 
failed to afford them.43 Observing a distinction in what the govern-
ment may permit private employees to do, the government could 
authorize private parties to enter into voluntary agreements con-
taining terms it could not adopt as its own. On this basis, objection 
was leveled against the two-tiered analysis of the plurality opinion, 
which placed the burden of litigation upon the employees, and not 
the state, to show that the exaction of such fees served a para-
mount government interest.44 
The views expressed by Justice Powell attacked the core of the 
majority's determination that public sector agency shop was not 
40. [d. at 238-40 (citing Street, 367 U.S. at 774-75, and Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 
113, 122 (1963». 
41. The constitutional sufficiency of internal remedies was not addressed. 
42. 431 U.S. at 257 (Powell, J., concurring). 
43. [d. at 253. 
44. [d. at 255. 
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fully subject to constitutional restraints. Having given superficial 
endorsement to agency shop as here conceptualized, the Court 
failed to address individual rights where the notion of exclusivity 
might be questionable.u Moreover, it failed to define, either defini-
tively or artificially, the parameters of the "political spending" 
exception. 
III. COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS VERSUS FIRST AMENDMENT 
FREEDOMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROGENY OF Abood 
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Abood 
sanctioning the validity of public sector agency shop provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements, the courts of various jurisdictions 
have been called upon to address the constitutionality of such pro-
visions under similar and dissimilar circumstances.46 This section 
will focus on the interpretive treatment given to agency shop 
agreements by the Michigan courts.47 
45. See supra notes 5, 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
46. Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that two tenured 
school teachers were not required to submit to the association's rebate procedures mandated 
by state statute or to pay the service fee, pending the resolution of the challenge. 
Mandating resort to the rebate procedure here would produce a further constitu-
tional difficulty because of the requirements that the entire fee be paid to the 
association pending proof of legitimacy. The teachers should not be required to 
suffer an interim constitutional deprivation, while the association is deprived of 
funds to which it is entitled by statute and agreement. The burden of justifying 
the fee or permissible amount must rest on the organization. 
School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 431 N.E.2d ISO (1982). 
Virtually simultaneous with the issuance of this decision was a Ninth Circuit United 
States Court of Appeals decision captioned Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, 685 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1982). In this 
case, the employees brought an action against the union, contesting the facial validity of the 
dues payment obligation imposed by the union shop agreement. The court of appeals held 
that (a) the union's program, by which each protesting employee received a rebate on his or 
her pro rata share of union disbursements for political and ideological activity, vindicated 
plaintiff's rights, and (b) union expenditures for conventions and union litigation not having 
as its subject matter contract negotiations and grievance processing/adjustment promoted 
the union and rendered it a more effective vehicle through which employee rights were pre-
served. Thus, objecting employees could be required to absorb a fair share of the cost of the 
activities. With respect to the specific political challenges, the court held that costs germane 
to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining could be sustained, and the 
trial court's application of the preponderance of the evidence standard to prove the propor-
tion of political to total union expenditures was correctly applied. 
47. Labor arbitrators, as well as courts, have been required to address the issue of public 
sector agency agreements. In Michigan, the seminal case in this respect is Garden City 
Educ. Ass'n, MEA/NEA and Garden City Public Schools. The case involved the interpreta-
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The general inquiry will bear upon the merits of applying vari-
ous forms of private union security schemes to that of the public 
sector. The important factor to be considered in evaluating the ex-
tent to which courts have permitted union security to intrude or 
impinge upon protected employee interests is whether private and 
public sector union security law constitutes a constitutional "dis-
tinction without a difference. "48 
The Michigan regulatory scheme for the conduct of labor-man-
agement relations at the local level, patterned after federal law, 
serves as the statutory labryrinth in which much of the court's 
analysis has been directed.49 The regulatory scheme is a congruent 
outgrowth of the upsurge in public sector labor organization.lio The 
United States Department of Labor recently commented on this 
upsurge, noting that 
[i]n recent years the level of public employee labor relations activity has 
increased dramatically. In October, 1973, there were 14.1 million public 
employees, an increase of more than one half million over the previous 
year. Not only have the ranks of public employment continued to swell, 
but the extent of organization has also been growing at an ever faster 
rate. Since 1960, membership in public sector unions and employee as-
sociations has more than doubled. . . . As can be expected, the develop-
ment of legislative and policy decisions and guidelines has also acceler-
tion to be given to the "agency fee" provision of the 1974-76 collective bargaining agreement 
between the Garden City Education Association and the Garden City Board of Education. 
The Association pressed its grievance to arbitration subsequent to the denial of the demand 
upon the Board to commence tenure proceedings against two teachers for failure to tender 
fees allegedly owing to the Association pursuant to contractual language contained within 
the agreement. The arbitrator decided the case on a very narrow ground, namely that the 
parties had negotiated language pertaining to "dues and assessments" which could be im-
posed upon union members and nonmembers alike only where found to be germane to nego-
tiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement. (The collective bargaining 
agreement, the arbitrator concluded, expressly incorporated state and federal law, and ergo 
the language in dispute could not be interpreted by the arbitrator in a way which would 
disparage or deny the rights of any teacher guaranteed by law.) (Unpublished opinion and 
award). 
48. See Abood 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977). 
49. Most state statutes which were enacted replicated the model of the National Labor 
Relations Act. 
50. Similar developments have occurred in the federal sector beginning with President 
Kennedy's Exec. Order No. 10,988 for federal employees (3 C.F.R. 21, 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1983), 
issued January 17, 1962; later updated by President Nixon's Exec. Order No. 11,491, as 
amended, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969); Exec. Order No. 11,616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17,319 (1971); 
Exec. Order No. 11,636, 36 Fed. Reg. 24901 (1971); Exec. Order No. 11,836, 40 Fed. Reg. 
5743 (1975); Exec. Order No. 11,901, 41 Fed. Reg. 4807 (1976». 
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ated with this dynamic growth. More states have taken it upon 
themselves to enact laws or establish administrative relations across the 
country.n 
35 
The right to negotiate an agency shop provision which 
culminates in the termination of a non-payer was upheld soon af-
ter the Public Employment Relations Act came into existence in 
Michigan. In Oakland County Sheriff's Department & Oakland 
County Board of Supervisors & Metropolitan Council 23, Ameri-
can Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-
CIO, the right to negotiate such provisions was given judicial sanc-
tion, even in the absence of specific statutory authority. iiI With the 
enactment of the amendment to the Public Employment Relations 
Act (PERA)1i3 in 1973, the negotiability of the agency shop provi-
sion was confirmed.64 
In Rockwell v. Crestwood School District,1i1i the Michigan Su-
preme Court, relying upon its previous decisions in Detroit Police 
Officers Association v. Detroit,1I6 and Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Employment Relations Commission,1i7 held that strik-
ing teachers who were discharged were not engaged in lawful and 
protected concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or "other mutual aid and protection within the meaning of sec-
tion 9 of the PERA. "116 The Court, in sustaining the discharges, 
observed that PERA governs in a conflict between the Teachers' 
Tenure Act, which permits imposition of discipline only after 
charges, notice, hearing and determination, and PERA which con-
templates imposition of discipline before a determination of 
whether the Act has been violated.1i9 
51. Summary of State Policy Regulations and Public Sector Labor Relations, U.S. De-
partment of Labor-Management Services Administrator, Divison of Public Employee Labor 
Relations (1975). 
52. MERC Labor Opinions l(a)(I968). 
53. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 423.201-16 (1979). PERA is the dominant Michigan law 
regulating public employee labor relations. See Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 393 Mich. 616, 629, 227 N.W.2d 736, 741 (1975). 
54. The constitutional validity of the amendatory act was established in Abood. 431 U.S. 
209 (1977). 
55. 393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975). 
56. 391 Mich. 44, 241 N.W.2d 803 (1974). 
57. 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973). 
58. 393 Mich. at 638, 227 N.W.2d at 745. 
59. [d. at 628, 227 N.W.2d at 741. 
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Whether the procedures established in the Teachers' Tenure Act 
for teacher termination would have to be complied with where a 
non-payer was concerned was the key issue in Swartz Creek Edu-
cation Association v. Swartz Creek Community Schools & State 
Tenure Commission.60 The defendant, in this case, filed an unfair 
labor practice charge against the Swartz Creek School District on 
the basis that it was enforcing an agency shop provision under an 
existing labor contract which required her to pay security fees to 
the Association on pain of discharge. The charge, as reviewed by 
MERC, was deemed to be non-meritorious. Based on this decision, 
the School Board and the Association included an agency shop 
provision in the subsequent contract executed for the year 1974-75. 
Challenged subsequently, and on review before the Michigan 
Teachers' Tenure Commission, it was held that the agency shop 
provision as negotiated was indeed constitutional, but the failure 
to tender prescribed dues and fees was an insufficient basis upon 
which to discharge a teacher pursuant to the Teachers' Tenure 
Act.6t 
Further confirmation to the validity of agency shop clauses was 
given by the Newaygo County Circuit Court in White Cloud Edu-
cation Association v. Board of Education of the White Cloud Pub-
lic Schools.62 Speaking through Judge Thomas, the court said 
[tJhis Court holds that the present controversy is a matter of public 
employment labor relations and therefore the Public Employment Rela-
tions Act is dominant and controlling (Rockwell v. Crestwood School 
District, 393 Mich. 616 (1975)). The Public Employment Relations Act 
expressly authorizes Plaintiff and Defendant to enter into a labor agree-
ment and to include in that agreement an agency shop provision. This 
Court sees no inconsistency between the Public Employment Relations 
Act and the facts of the case at bar. The inconsistency advocated by the 
Defendant is between the Public Employment Relations Act and a deci-
sion of the State Teachers' Tenure Commission as reported in Kathryn 
Jackson v. Swartz Creek Community Schools.8s 
With a well-lubricated arsenal of judicial dicta In hand, the 
60. No. 78 290 A.A. (1978). 
61. The case was subsequently reargued in Genesee County Circuit Court. Due to the 
grievant's retirement from the school district, the case was declared moot on the substantive 
issue. 
62. No. 79-4506 C.I. (1979). 
63. [d. 
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Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court were 
then called upon to address the issue of compulsory security fee 
exaction vis a vis the Teachers' Tenure Act. 
In Detroit Board of Education v. Parks,6" the issue of whether 
the Public Employment Relations Act pre-empted the Teachers' 
Tenure Act was confronted by the court of appeals. Parks involved 
the discharge of a tenured teacher who tendered 1973-74 service 
fees under protest to the Detroit Federation of Teachers, the desig-
nated exclusive bargaining agent for the teachers. She thereafter 
refused to pay, even after Abood was decided. Consequently, in 
1978, she was discharged from her position. She appealed her dis-
missal to the State Tenure Commission, asserting that the Michi-
gan Teachers' Tenure Act precludes discharges of this type unless 
the Board was able to support the "reasonable and just cause stan-
dard" set forth in section II of the Act. She further contended that 
the discharge occurred without any of the procedural safeguards 
accorded to those persons maintaining vested property rights.611 
The court recognized the need to maintain due process safe-
guards through the procedural application of the Michigan Teach-
ers' Tenure Act. Parks, or any other similarly situated tenured 
teacher, would therefore be entitled to notice and an opportunity 
to be heard prior to discharge for failure to pay agency shop fees. 
The court, recognizing the Board as having a valid interest in 
the enforcement of the agency shop provision, concluded that this 
interest should not be outweighed by an employee's interest in 
pressing a claim of entitlement sufficient to justify a property 
right. Irrespective of the taint engendered by the lack of proce-
dural due process, the court of appeals held that Parks' discharge 
64. 98 Mich. App. 22 (1980); (originally consolidated with Warczak v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92 (1975)). Parks was originally a plaintiff in the Warczak case. The 
order of Judge Kaufman, issued in January of 1970, stated that the agency shop clause 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement was valid and "does not contravene the 
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Michigan or the statutes of the State of 
Michigan including PERA and the Tenure Act." This judgment was vacated by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court in 1972, and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 389 
Mich. 755 (1972). Abood was then filed and consolidated with Warczak for the remand pro-
ceedings. The defendants again prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. The order of 
Judge Kaufman held that PERA authorized prospective and retrospective agency shop 
clauses and, in essence, restated the 1970 order. The plaintiffs thus appealed this decision to 
the Michigan Court of Appeals. 
65. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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was unambiguously authorized by the agency shop clause between 
the Detroit Federation of Teachers and the Board, and was not 
prohibited or affected by anything in the Tenure Act.sS 
Thus, once again, the Michigan Court of Appeals sustained the 
supremacy of the Public Employment Relations Act as the domi-
nant law regulating public employee labor relations.s" Relying 
upon the authority of cases previously cited, the court made only 
an oblique reference to the issue of whether the exaction of agency 
shop fees as a condition of employment is constitutionally permis-
sible.ss The court of appeals concluded that such 'fees were permis-
sible so long as they were used for collective bargaining purposes, 
and the failure to tender the fees would be sufficient to raise a 
tenured teacher's conduct to a level of "reasonable and just cause" 
justifying dismissal. 
Parks and its consolidated cases were appealed to the Michigan 
Supreme Court. S9 In a majority opinion authored by Justice 
Brickley, the court held that a tenured teacher may be discharged 
for failure to pay agency service fees to the authorized bargaining 
agent despite the fact that a less harsh penalty could have been 
agreed upon by the parties."o 
After a tenuous beginning, the court concluded that the Teach-
ers' Tenure Act was inapplicable to labor disputes of this ilk. The 
court deemed PERA the dominant law regulating public employee 
labor relations, and all other conflicting statutes were diminished 
pro tanto. '11 PERA, observed the court, authorized the use of 
agency shop clauses in collective bargaining agreements, and there-
fore such clauses should be given judicial recognition and enforce-
66. 98 Mich. App. at 38-39, 296 N.W.2d at 822-23 (1980). 
67. Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 393 Mich. 616,629, 227 N.W.2d 
736, 741 (1975). In a more recent case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Public 
Employment Relations Act prevails over conflicting legislation, charters and ordinances in 
the face of challenges by cities, counties, public universities and school districts. Local 1383, 
Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Warren, 411 Mich. 642, 311 N.W.2d 702 
(1981). 
68. See generally Abood, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Street, 367 
U.S. 740 (1961). 
69. Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Parks, 417 Mich. 268, 335 N.W.2d 641 (1983). While the 
Abood appeal was pending in the United States Supreme Court, the complaint in Kyes v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ. was filed. Kyes was thereafter consolidated with Abood and Parks. 
70. [d. at 278, 335 N.W.2d at 646. 
71. [d. at 280, 335 N.W.2d at 647. 
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ment.72 The court stated that 
[w)e find it inconceivable that, in adopting the phrase 'to require as a 
condition of employment' from federal law, the Michigan Legislature did 
not also intend to adopt the construction placed on that language by the 
federal courts. Even without this authority, we would find it difficult to 
allow any other interpretation than the obvious 'condition of employ-
ment' as used in section lO(1)(c) means that employment may be condi-
tioned on payment of the agency service fees. 73 
39 
Appellants argued alternatively that the availability of remedies 
less oppressive than discharge precluded a finding that discharge 
was a permissible remedy.7. The court noted that PERA is permis-
sive, and alternative remedies can be provided.711 Where, however, 
parties in a collective bargaining relationship have expressly desig-
nated the remedy of discharge in their governing document, dis-
charge is appropriate.76 The court rejected the contention that the 
Teachers' Tenure Act requires just and reasonable cause for em-
ployment termination and that this provision can co-exist with 
PERA. It affirmed that PERA was the only controlling statute in 
these circumstances and noted that a closer inspection of PERA's 
purpose disclosed "a repugnancy between it and the reasonable 
and just cause standard of the Teachers' Tenure Act."77 The court 
rationalized PERA's supremacy as follows: 
The primary purpose of the Teachers' Tenure Act is to maintain an ade-
quate and competent teaching staff, free from political and personal in-
terference. Boyce v. Royal Oak Board of Education, 407 Mich. 312; 285 
N.W.2d 196 (1979). The Act was not designed to cover labor disputes 
. . . . The procedures of the Teachers' Tenure Act are designed to pro-
tect a tenured teacher from discharge for improper reasons, reasons other 
than those of professional competency .... We cannot conclude that 
the Legislature intended to also use this elaborate procedure for the sim-
ple purpose of determining whether a teacher has, in fact, paid his 
agency service fees. 78 
Thus, with the decision in Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court 
squarely confronted and disposed of an issue which had dominated 
72. [d. at 277-78, 335 N.W.2d at 646. 
73. [d. (emphasis added). 
74. [d. at 278, 335 N.W.2d at 646. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. at 279, 335 N.W.2d at 647. 
77. [d. at 280, 335 N.W.2d at 647. 
78. [d. at 281-82, 335 N.W.2d at 648. 
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the labor relations scene for at least six years. PERA's domination 
in regulating public employee labor relations was confirmed. 
The critical inquiry which the courts have keenly, or otherwise, 
avoided is the legality of dues expended for subjects falling outside 
the scope of collective bargaining. There has been no attempt on 
the part of the Michigan judiciary to define, with specificity, the 
issues advanced in the seminal case of Abood. This became evident 
when the Michigan Supreme Court rendered its decision in Falh u. 
State Bar of Michigan. 79 
The plaintiff in Falh, an attorney, challenged Rule 4B of the 
Rules of the State Bar of Michigan concerning the payment of 
dues. The dues requirement is mandatory for active members of 
the State Bar of Michigan. Attorneys must submit to the fee as-
sessment in order to secure membership in the State Bar. 
One aspect of the challenge leveled by Falk pertained to the 
State Bar budget appropriation for 1977-78. The appropriation in-
cluded $108,443.00 to be funneled to public relations efforts 
designed to improve the image of the Bar.8o In addition, plaintiff 
contended, numerous expenditures were made to support the ac-
tivities of the American Bar Association and the State Bar of 
Michigan, which groups publicly espoused positions prompting leg-
islative, executive and administrative action, and which were 
deemed violative of the right of association and expression.8! 
Unlike Abood, this case did not deal with a prior protest to the 
union, or other applicable administrative body, as a prerequisite to 
invoking judicial relief. Not only was the dues payment obligation 
under direct attack, but the plaintiff buttressed his position by al-
leging that dues were paid and political expenditures were made. 
The opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court did not produce a 
majority position.82 The Ryan perspective, concurred in by Moody 
79. 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981). 
80. [d. at 85, 305 N.W.2d at 202. 
81. Falk set forth in his detailed brief the basis upon which the State Bar activities 
constituted a violation of the first amendment rights and freely-held religious beliefs. [d. at 
85 n.3, 305 N.W.2d at 202 n.3. 
82. Three separate opinions were issued by the Michigan Supreme Court. The first opin-
ion, filed by Justice Ryan, and joined in by Justices Moody and Fitzgerald, held that Falk 
was entitled to partial relief. The second opinion was filed by Justice Williams in which he 
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. Justice Coleman joined in this opinion. 
The final opinion was issued by Justice Levin and joined in by Justice Kavanaugh. He held 
that additional evidentiary hearings were required. No member of the court, however, ad-
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and Fitzgerald, held that Falk's strong reliance on Abood was mis-
placed. Noting that Abood concerned compulsory dues in a union 
organization, and not association in an integrated bar, the court 
said that the critical test as to whether "ideological expenditures 
not necessarily in derogation of First Amendment rights" rises and 
falls with the degree to which it is germane to the compelling state 
interest established.83 However, the compelling state interest in . 
Abood differed significantly from the compelling state interest ad-
vanced by the factual matrix in this case. In Abood, the compelling 
state interest involved the promotion of labor stability, law en-
forcement and judicial support for union security agreements. In 
Falk, the compelling state interest was the administration of jus-
tice and the advancement of jurisprudence. 
More importantly, however, assuming arguendo that the Ryan 
triumvirate would have found sufficient compelling state interest 
to justify intrusion or encroachment upon the first amendment, 
Falk's petition for special relief would nevertheless remain fatal. 
The opinion, which noted that the petitioner failed to specify the 
exact nature of the statements or activities to which he took intel-
lectual or ideological offense, concluded that the challenges were 
leveled, not at the State Bar lobbying acitivites, but at the expend-
itures of funds to engage in such activities. Thus, the challenges 
were monetary and not ideological. 
The only aspect of Petitioner's Request for Special Relief which 
a majority of the court conceded as legitimate was point (11) per-
taining to the use of the State Bar's mailing list for commercial 
purposes. The court observed that the intrusion which results from 
the use of commercial mailings is not minimal.84 This conclusion 
relied principally upon Rowan v. United States Post Office De-
partment86, where Chief Justice Burger noted that "[w]ithout 
doubt the public postal system is an indispensable adjutant of 
every civilized society. Communication is imperative to a healthy 
social order. But the right of every person to be let alone must be 
dressed the issue of tortious invasion of privacy since Mr. Falk's original pleading did not 
state such a claim. The court observed, "since we find no claim was pled for invasion of 
privacy, no relief requested, and inadequate proofs offered, we will not reach the issue 
.... " ld. 
83. ld. at 138, 305 N.W.2d at 228. 
84. ld. at 118, 164,305 N.W.2d at 218, 240. 
85. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
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placed in the scales with the right of the other to communicate."88 
Thus, the court held that the petitioner maintained the inherent 
right to lessen any intrusion into his private domain. Since mass 
mailings did not promote the purpose of administering justice, 
Falk had the right to demand the removal of his name from the 
mailing list. 
The Williams' opinion meticulously addressed the validity of the 
constitutional challenges advanced by Falk. The opinion initially 
focused on whether first amendment rights are absolute. Relying 
on Koningsberg u. State Bar of California,87 Williams observed 
that freedom of speech and association are not absolute, despite its 
importance to the Constitution and society. However, Williams 
proceeded to note that, even though the first amendment is not 
absolute, the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest to 
justify any constitutional intrusion. A mere showing of a legitimate 
interest is inadequate to pass constitutional muster. The ability to 
exercise personal liberties in an essentially unrestrained manner is 
fundamental to a democratic form of government. 
The most important aspect of the Williams' opinion was the de-
termination of the appropriate test to analyze petitioner's constitu-
tional challenges. Referring to the United States Supreme Court's 
Abood decision, in which the Court abdicated the use of the "least 
intrusive means," it noted that the most logical test was "whether 
the state has a compelling interest involved, and if so, whether the 
Bar's complained of activities are germane to that interest."88 The 
opinion concluded by noting that "promoting improvements in the 
administration of justice and advancements in jurisprudence" is a 
compelling state interest, and deserves the protection of the state. 
"The fair and efficient use of the state legal system is paramount 
to the state's very existence. Without a legal system to make, inter-
pret and enforce laws, without some mechanism to weigh and re-
solve conflicting claims, there is anarchy."89 
Levin's opinion embraced the issues, facts and history of the 
case as set forth by Justice Ryan's and Justice Williams' opinions. 
Concluding that a determination of the issues in Falk was ham-
86. Id. at 736, quoted in Falk, 411 Mich. at 163, 305 N.W.2d at 239. 
87. 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). 
88. 411 Mich. at 138, 305 N.W.2d at 227-28. 
89. Id. at 140, 305 N.W.2d at 228. 
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pered by the indefiniteness of both the principles advanced in 
Abood and the record in Falk,90 Levin observed that only through 
official remand proceedings could an assessment be made as to the 
promotion of issues which are directly related to the practice of 
law and the administration of justice. Applying a standard of judi-
cial scrutiny prior to such an assessment would be inconsequential. 
On remand, the burden was placed on the petitioner to identify 
with particularity the nature of the infringement of first amend-
ment rights. The burden on the State Bar was to demonstrate a 
solid connection between its activities and a state interest, as well 
as the impact which intrusive alternatives would have in furthering 
that interest.9 } 
Despite the variety of opinions issued in Falk, none of the jus-
tices were concerned that there was no exclusive bargaining agent 
through which third-party beneficiary rights were established and 
defined. The court in general treated compulsory membership in a 
90. 1d. at 167-71, 305 N.W.2d at 242-44. 
91. As this article went into print, the Michigan Supreme Court handed down another 
decision in the continuing saga of Falk v. State Bar of Michigan. In a unanimous per curiam 
opinion, the court held that 
[tJhe plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for in his 'Petition for Special 
Relief.' However, because the proceeding convinced the court that certain prac-
tices of the State Bar are inappropriate, the court, under its powers of superin-
tending control, will appoint a committee to review those practices and activities 
and make recommendations to the court. 
Falk, No. 60722 (Dec. 29, 1983). 
Three separate opinions were also filed, reflecting the Justices' spectrum of views. Justice 
Boyle, joined by Chief Justice Williams, held that while plaintiff's first amendment interests 
were infringed by the Bar's political activities, the government interest outweighed the in-
jury. "This is not a case where plaintiff is being forced to personally express his own agree-
ment with the political positions of the bar .... Plaintiff is required to support the legisla-
tive positions taken by the bar only through indirect financial contributions" 1d. at 16 n.88. 
(of Justice Boyle's opinion)(emphasis added). Moreover, the plaintiff did not meet the bur-
den of proof necessary to demonstrate that the non-political activities of the Bar had in-
fringed on a first amendment right. Justice Boyle observed that Falk's primary objection to 
the non-political activities was that such activities had not conferred any economic benefit 
to him. This interest was not deemed subject to first amendment protection. Justices Kava-
naugh and Levin concurred in this disposition. 
Justice Ryan, joined by Justices Brickley and Cavanagh, held that compulsory dues for 
inclusion in the State Bar are valid: "[tJhe State of Michigan had shown a compelling state 
interest in certain functions of the bar which could not be advanced by less intrusive 
means." 1d. at 4 (of Justice Ryan's opinion). Justice Ryan held, further, that political and 
legislative activities are impermissible intrusions as are activities designed to further com-
mercial and economic interests of the Bar. The Bar should determine the portion of dues 
paid which cannot be constitutionally justified, and reduce the dues accordingly. 1d. 
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state bar organization as a situation which raises the issue of bar-
gaining for the administration of justice versus political and eco-
nomic activities. Although previous rulings of various courts may 
have skirted the principal issue, Falk did yield a specific mandate; 
the State Bar may freely, and without question, compulsorily exact 
dues and require association to support only those duties and func-
tions of the State Bar which serve a compelling state interest and 
which cannot be accomplished by means less intrusive upon the 
first amendment rights of the objecting affected individuals. 
The issues in Falk have spawned interesting legislative activity. 
In New Jersey, a statute was enacted in 1980 which imposed a lim-
itation of eight-five percent of regular membership dues for agency 
shop non-payers.92 The trend, as perceived by this author, is that 
future challenges to an Abood infringement will not yield illumi-
nating discourses or colloquies on whether the government has 
properly met its burden of proof to justify an intrusion into sacro-
sanct individual liberties, but rather the extent to which such in-
trusion can and will be judicially tolerated. 
CONCLUSION 
The most critical concern which percolates into the public sector 
mainstream and affects employment relations is the extent to 
which certain activities and functions fall within the rubric of the 
political spending doctrine. Unions, to function effectively, must 
acquire some degree of financial stability. Financial stability serves 
to foster reliability and responsiveness to the problems inherent in 
the workplace. To deal with the concerns raised by this Article, 
should the extent of recognition conferred by the local constitu-
ency upon the unions be taken into consideration? Should a differ-
ent set of standards apply if the union is newly organized and re-
quires substantial financial support before it can adequately 
engage in the bargaining activities tolerated and contemplated by 
court decisions? 
Is a certain amount of political involvement necessary to pre-
serve a balance within public sector employment relations? Is this 
activity to be tolerated to a greater level simply because the lines 
92. N.J. STAT. ANN., § 1317-5.4 (1980). Other legislatures are considering the enactment 
of similar, if not identical, statutes. 
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between political and bargaining activities are unclear? A recent 
article noted that both historical and practical considerations mili-
tate against restrictive or narrow policies in the public sector.93 
"Union objectives and unions members' economic interests are as 
directly affected by tax policies as bargaining wage rates. "94 Thus, 
it becomes an undiluted truth that collective bargaining in the 
public sector is "inherently political." To be successful in public 
sector unionism, some political activity is necessary. The right to 
organize and bargain was achieved through political activity; the 
gains sought for the membership through the negotiation process 
imbue it with political character. 
For public sector unionism to remain a vital and viable force in 
protecting individual rights through collective action, agency shop 
clauses must be carefully constructed, but nevertheless permitted. 
Such permissiveness furthers the federal and state policy favoring 
stability in employment relations. 
The role of the courts has dramatically changed since the Su-
preme Court's decision in Abood. While courts may be called upon 
to ascertain deprivation of due process as it affects rebate plans, 
the critical focus of the courts will become, not whether the agency 
shop agreement is per se constitutional, but rather, the extent to 
which political and ideological expenditures in direct contravention 
to the challengers' liberties is to be given judicial sanction. Thus, 
the succeeding line of cases will be largely unaffected by the ideol-
ogy of laissez-faire and traditional cultist economics and the coun-
tervailing ideology of ipso facto permissibility of union security 
agreements. All agency shop agreements constitute some infringe-
ment upon free speech and association rights. Recognizing that 
such curtailment of individual liberties is necessary to promote the 
common good and common interest, the courts must act cautiously 
so as to avoid rendering short-sighted or narrow decisions. The 
court's constitutional mandate is not to second-guess its legislative 
counterpart. Thus, the court's role, post Abood and Palh should be 
one of circumspection and surveillance, so as to ensure that collec-
tive bargaining activities are not a guise for advancing partisan 
93. Rehmus and Kerner, The Agency Shop After Abood: No Free Ride, But What's the 
Fare?, CALIF. PUB. EMPLOYER REL. (1980). 
94. [d. at 11. 
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political interests. Only then can the federal and state policies 
favoring stability in labor relations be achieved. 
